

*lit hist v 11*

ALTERATIONS  
AND  
ADDITIONS

Made in the  
SECOND EDITION  
OF THE  
*Inquiry into* BEAUTY and  
VIRTUE.

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
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ALTERATIONS  
AND  
ADDITIONS  
TO THE  
FIRST TREATISE.

**S**ECT. I. Pages 3d and 4th, *the sixth Article is plac'd before the fifth of the first Edition.*

ART. vii. Page 4. *is limited to simple Ideas: to the end of this Paragraph is added what follows.*

MANY of our simple Perceptions are disagreeable, only through the too great *intenseness* of the Quality: thus, moderate Light is agreeable, very strong Light may be painful; moderate Bitter may be pleasant, a higher Degree may be offensive. A change in our Organs will necessarily occasion a change in the *Intenseness* of the Perception at least; nay, sometimes will occasion a quite contrary Perception: thus, a warm Hand will feel that Water cold, which a cold Hand shall feel warm.

A 2

*The*



## *Alterations and Additions*

*The Conclusion of this Article in Page 6th limited to simple Ideas.*

SECT. II. Page 16. Line 21. after [*Figure*] read, or of the Circle to which regular Polygons have an obvious relation.

P. 26. l. 1st and 2d, read, coincide in *Time* with two Vibrations of its Octave.

IBID. l. 5th, dele from [*now*] to [*necessity of*] in l. 9th, and insert what follows.

Now no Composition can be harmonious, in which the Notes are not, for the most part, dispos'd according to these natural Proportions: besides which, a due regard must be had to the *Key* which governs the Whole, and to the *Time*, and *Humour*, in which the Composition is begun; an inartificial change of any of which, will produce the greatest and most unnatural *Discord*.

IBID. l. 15th, after the word [*Tune*] insert,

THERE is, indeed, in the best Compositions, a mysterious Effect of *Discords*; they often give as great Pleasure as continu'd Harmony: whether by refreshing the Ear with Variety, or by awaking the Attention, and enlivening the Relish for the succeeding Harmony of *Concords*; as  
Shades



Shades enliven and beautify Pictures, or by some other means, not yet known: Certain it is, however, that they have their Place, and some good Effect in our best Compositions.

SECT. III. P. 28. l. 3. *after the word [Theorem] blot out the Remainder of the Paragraph, and insert what follows.*

IN *Algebraick*, and *Fluxional Calculations*, we shall still find a greater Variety of particular *Truths*, included in general *Theorems*; not only in general *Equations*, applicable to all Kinds of Quantity; but in more particular Investigations of *Areas*, and *Tangents*: in which, one manner of Operation shall discover Theorems, applicable to infinite *Orders* or *Species* of *Curves*, to the infinite *Sizes* of each Species, and to the infinite *Points* of the infinite *Individuals* of each *Size*.

P. 29th, *after Article iv. insert,*

WE may likewise observe, that easy or obvious Propositions, even where the *Unity* is sufficiently distinct and determinate, do not please us so much as those which, being less obvious, give us some *surprize* in the Discovery: thus, we find little Pleasure in discovering that, *A Line bisecting the Vertical Angle of an Isosceles does also bisect the Base*, or the reverse: or, that *Equilateral Triangles are Equiangular.*

gular. These Truths we also know *intuitively*, without Demonstration: They are like common Goods, or those which Men have long possess'd, which do not give such sensible Joy as much smaller new Additions may give us. But let none hence imagine, that the sole Pleasure of Theorems is from surprize; for the same *Novelty* of a single Experiment does not please us much: nor ought we to conclude from the greater Pleasure accompanying a *new* or *unexpected* Advantage, that *Surprize* or *Novelty* is the only Pleasure of Life, or the only Ground of Delight in *Truth*.

*P. 33. before Art. vi. insert this Paragraph.*

IF any alledge, " That this Pleasure in  
 " *Theorems* arises only at first, upon the  
 " *Novelty* of the Discovery, which occasions  
 " *Surprize*:" It must be own'd, indeed, that *Novelty* is generally very agreeable, and heightens the Pleasure in the Contemplation of Beauty; but then the *Novelty* of a particular Truth, found out by measuring, as abovemention'd, gives no considerable Pleasure nor Surprize. That then which is *pleasant* and *surprizing*, is the first Observation of this *Unity* amidst such a great *Variety*. There is, indeed, another kind of *Surprize*, which adds to the Beauty of some Propositions less *universal*, and may make them equally pleasant



sant with more universal ones; as when we discover a general Truth, which seem'd before, upon some confus'd Opinion, to be a Falsehood: as, that *Assymptotes always approaching should never meet the Curve*. This is like that Joy which may be very strong and violent, upon the unexpected Arrival of a small Advantage, from that Occasion, from which we apprehended great Evil. But still this *Unity* of many Particulars in the general Theorem, is necessary to make it pleasant in any Case.

SECT. V. P. 58. before Art. xv. insert this Paragraph.

ONE Objection further remains to be remov'd, viz. " That some imagine this  
 " Argument may hold better *à priori*,  
 " than *à posteriori*; that is, We have  
 " better Reason to believe, when we see a  
 " Cause about to act, without Knowledge,  
 " that he will not attain any given or de-  
 " sir'd End; than we have on the other  
 " hand to believe, when we see an End  
 " actually attained, that he acted with  
 " Knowledge: Thus, say they, when a  
 " Man is about to draw a Ticket in a  
 " Lottery, where there is but one Prize  
 " to a thousand Blanks, it is highly pro-  
 " bable that he shall draw a Blank; but  
 " suppose we have seen him actually draw  
 " for himself the Prize, we have no ground  
 " to conclude, that he had Knowledge or  
 " Art



“ *Art* to accomplish this End.” But the Answer is obvious: In such Contrivances we generally have from the very Circumstances of the Lottery, very strong moral Arguments, which almost demonstrate that *Art* can have no place; so that a Probability of 1000 to 1, does not surmount those Arguments: but let the Probability be increased, and it will soon surmount all *moral* Arguments to the contrary. For instance, if we saw a Man ten times successively draw Prizes, in a Lottery, where there were but ten Prizes to ten thousand Blanks, I fancy few would question whether he us’d *Art* or not: Much less would we imagine it were Chance, if we saw a Man draw for his own Gain, successively, a hundred, or a thousand Prizes, from among a proportionably greater Number of Blanks. Now, in the Works of *Nature*, the Case is entirely different; we have not the least Argument against *Art* or *Design*. An intelligent Cause is surely, at least, as probable a Notion as *Chance*, *General Force*, *Conatus ad Motum*, or the *Clinamen Principiorum*, to account for any Effect whatsoever: And then all the *Regularity*, *Combinations*, *Similaritys of Species*, are so many Demonstrations that there was *Design* and *Intelligence* in the CAUSE of this Universe: whereas, in fair Lotterys, all *Art*, or *Wisdom* in drawing, is made, if not actually impossible, at least highly improbable.

SECT.

SECT. VIII. P. 89. after l. 9. insert  
*this Paragraph.*

IT is true, indeed, that the Enjoyment of the greatest Pleasures of the *internal Senses*, in the Contemplation of the Works of *Nature*, is expos'd to every one without Expence: The Poor, and the Low, may have as free a use of these Objects, in this way, as the Wealthy or Powerful. And even in Objects which may be appropriated, the *Property* is of little consequence to the Enjoyment of their Beauty; which is often enjoy'd by others beside the Proprietor. But then there are other Objects of these *internal Senses*, which require *Wealth* or *Power* to procure the Use of them as frequently as we desire; as appears in *Architecture*, *Musick*, *Gardening*, *Painting*, *Dress*, *Equipage*, *Furniture*; of which we cannot have the full Enjoyment without *Property*. And there are some confus'd *Imaginations*, which often lead us to pursue *Property*, even in Objects where it is not necessary to the true Enjoyment of them. These are the *ultimate Motives* of our pursuing the greater Degrees of *Wealth*, where there are no generous Intentions of virtuous Actions.

P. 97. add to the last Paragraph these  
*Words.*

B

NAY,



## *Alterations and Additions*

NAY, further, tho *general Laws* did ordinarily obtain, yet if the Deity usually stopp'd their Effect, whenever it was necessary to prevent any particular Evils; this would effectually supersede all human *Prudence* and *Care* about Actions, since a superior *Mind* did thus relieve Men from their Charge.

*End of the first Treatise.*

## *Alterations and Additions to the second Treatise.*

SECT. II. Page 130. *last Line, after* [computed] *add this Sentence.*

SINCE then no Love to *Rational Agents* can proceed from *Self-interest*, every Action must be disinterested, as far as it flows from Love to *Rational Agents*.

P. 141. *dele l. 19. and 20. these Words* [which shews that these Passions are not from Self-love] *in their place insert,*

WHICH shews that these Affections are neither chosen for their concomitant Pleasure, nor voluntarily brought on with a View to *private Good*.

*Lines*

*Lines 24, 25, dele ; in their place insert,*

BUT the Removal of our Pain is seldom directly intended in the uneasy *benevolent Passions* ; nor is the Alteration intended in the State of the Object by such Passions, imagin'd to be a private Good to the Agent, as it always is in the *selfish Passions*. If our sole Intention in *Compassion* or *Pity* were the Removal of our Pain, we should run away, &c.

SECT. III. P. 162. *these two Paragraphs are inserted between the End of Article vi. and the Beginning of Art. vii.*

WHEREVER a Regard to *my self*, tends as much to the Good of the Whole, as regard to *another* ; or where the *Evil* to my self, is equal to the *Good* obtain'd for another ; tho by acting in such Cases for the Good of another, I really shew a very amiable Disposition ; yet by acting in the contrary manner, from regard to *my self*, I evidence no evil Disposition, nor any want of the most extensive Benevolence : since the *Moment* of Good to the *Whole*, is in both Cases exactly equal. And let it be here observed, that this does not supersede the Necessity of *Liberality*, or *gratuitous Gifts*, altho in such Action the Giver loses as much as the other receives ; since



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the *Moment* of Good to any Person, in any given Case, is in a *Compound Ratio* of the *Quantity* of the Good it self, and the *Indigence* of the Person. Hence, it appears, that a Gift may make a much greater *Addition* to the Happiness of the *Receiver*, than the *Diminution* it occasions in the Happiness of the *Giver* : And that the most useful and important Gifts, are those from the *Wealthy* to the *Indigent*. Gifts from *Equals* are not useless neither, since they often increase the Happiness of both, as they are strong Evidences of *mutual Love* : But Gifts from the Poor to the Wealthy, are really foolish, unless they be only little Expressions of *Gratitude*, which are also fruitful of Joy on both sides ; for these Expressions of Gratitude, are really delightful and acceptable to the Wealthy, if they have any Humanity ; and their Acceptance of them is matter of Joy to the poor *Giver*.

IN like manner, when an Action does more *harm* to the *Agent*, than *good* to the *Publick*, the doing it evidences an amiable and truly virtuous Disposition in the Agent ; tho 'tis plain he acts upon a mistaken View of his Duty. But if the private Evil to the *Agent* be so great, as to make him incapable at another time of promoting a *Publick Good*, of greater moment than what is attain'd by this Action, the Action may really be *Evil*, so far as it  
evi-

evidences a prior Neglect of a greater *Publick Good* for a smaller one : tho at present, this Action also flows from a virtuous Disposition.

*P. 164, 165. instead of the Paragraph in the end of Page 164, and beginning of 165, insert this one.*

BUT the Consequences which affect the *Morality* of Actions, are not only the direct and natural *Effects* of the Actions themselves; but also all those *Events* which otherwise would not have happen'd. Thus *many Actions*, which have no immediate or natural *evil Effects*, nay, which actually produce *good Effects*, may be *Evil*; if a Man foresees, that the accidental evil *Consequences*, which will probably flow from the Folly of others upon his doing of such Actions, are so great as to overballance all the *good Effects* he proposes to attain by the Action, or all the *Evils* which would flow from the Omission of it : And in such Cases, the *Probability* is to be computed on both sides. Thus, if an Action of mine will probably, through the Mistakes or Corruption of others, be made a *Precedent*, in unlike Cases, to very evil Actions; or when my Action, tho good in it self, will probably provoke Men to very evil Actions, upon some *mistaken Notion* of their Right; any of these Considerations foreseen by me, may make such  
an



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an Action of mine *Evil*; whenever the *Evils* to be occasion'd by the *Action*, are probably greater than the *Evils* occasion'd by the *Omission*.

AND this is the Reason that many *Laws* prohibit Actions in general, even when some particular Instances of these Actions would be very useful; because an universal *Allowance* of them, considering the Mistakes Men would probably fall into, would be more pernicious than an *universal Prohibition*; nor could there be any more *special Boundaries* fix'd between the right and wrong Cases. In such Cases, it is the Duty of Persons to comply with the generally useful Constitution; or if in some very important Instances, the Violation of the Law would be of less *evil Consequence* than Obedience to it, they must patiently resolve to undergo those Penalties, which the State has, for valuable Ends to the Whole, appointed: and this Disobedience will have nothing criminal in it.

P. 168. Art. xi. before the last Paragraph of this Page, insert this Paragraph.

IN like manner, the *Moment* of private Good, or *Interest*, produc'd by any Person, is in a *Compound Ratio* of his *Self-love* and *Abilities*; or (substituting the initial Letters)  $I = S \times A$ .

P. 169. at bottom, after the word [*Agent*] insert,

IN the former Case,  $M = \overline{B} + S \times A = BA + SA$ ; and therefore,  $BA = M - SA = M - I$ , and  $B = \frac{M - I}{A}$ . In the latter Case,  $M = \overline{B} - S \times A = BA - SA$ ; Therefore,  $BA = M + SA = M + I$ , and  $B = \frac{M + I}{A}$ .

P. 174. l. 4. insert in the same Paragraph,

OR an Insensibility of their Misery, which we either actually foresee, or have a probable *Presumption* of.

IT is true, indeed, that *that publick Evil* which I neither certainly foresee, nor have actual Presumptions of, as the Consequence of my Action, does not make my *present Action* criminal, or odious; even altho I might have foreseen this *Evil*, by a serious Examination of my own Actions; because such Actions do not, at present, evidence either *Malice*, or *want of Benevolence*. But then it is also certain, that my *prior Negligence*, in not examining the Tendency of my Actions, is a plain evidence of the want of *that* Degree of good Affections, which is necessary to a virtuous Character; and consequently the *Guilt* properly lies in this *Neglect*, rather than in an Action which really flows from a  
good



*good Intention.* *Human Laws*, however, which cannot examine the *Intentions*, or the secret *Knowledge* of the Agent, must judge in gross of the Action it self; presupposing all that Knowledge as actually attained, which we are oblig'd to attain.

IN like manner, no *good Effect*, which I did not actually foresee and intend, makes my Action *morally Good*: however *human Laws*, and *Governours*, who cannot search into *Mens Intentions*, or know their secret *Designs*, justly reward Actions which in fact tend to the Publick Good, altho the Agent was engag'd to those Actions only by *selfish Views*, and consequently had no virtuous Disposition influencing him to them.

THE Difference in *degree of Guilt*, between *Crimes of Ignorance*, when the Ignorance is *vincible* and *faulty*, as to the natural Tendency of the Action; and *Crimes of Malice*, or direct evil Intention, consists in this; that the former, by a prior Neglect, argues the want of the due Degree of *Benevolence*, or *right Affection*: the latter evidences direct *evil Affections*, which are vastly more odious.

SECT. IV. P. 179. l. penult. after the Word [*Interest*] insert,

IF we sometimes blame foolish Conduct in others, without any Reflection upon its Tendency to *publick Evil*, it is occasion'd

tion'd still by our Benevolence, which makes us concern'd for the Evils befalling the *Agent*, whom we must always look upon as a part of the *System*.

P. 185. after last Line, insert this new Paragraph.

A LATE ingenious Author \* has justly observ'd the Absurdity of the monstrous *Taste*, which has possess'd both the *Readers* and *Writers* of Travels. They scarce give us any account of the *natural Affections*, the *Familys*, *Associations*, *Friendships*, *Clans* of the *Indians*; and as rarely do they mention their Abhorrence of *Treachery* among themselves; their *Proneness* to mutual Aid, and to the Defence of their several *States*; their Contempt of Death in Defence of their *Country*, or upon Points of *Honour*. " These are but *common Sto-*  
" *rys*— No need to travel to the *In-*  
" *dies*, for what we see in *Europe* every  
" *Day*." The Entertainment therefore in these ingenious Studys, consists chiefly in exciting *Horror*, and making Men *stare*. The ordinary Employment of the Bulk of the *Indians*, in support of their Wives and Offspring, or Relations, has nothing of the *Prodigious*: But a *Human Sacrifice*, a Feast upon Enemys Carcases, can

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\* *Ld. Shaftesbury*, Vol. I. p. 346, 7, 8, 9, &c.



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raise an Horror, and Admiration of the wondrous Barbarity of *Indians*, in Nations no Strangers to the *Massacre* at *Paris*, the *Irish Rebellion*, or the Journals of the *Inquisition*. These they behold with religious Veneration; but the *Indian Sacrifices*, flowing from a like Perversion of *Humanity* by *Superstition*, raise the highest Abhorrence and Amazement. What is most surprizing in these Studys, is the wondrous *Credulity* of some Gentlemen, of great Pretensions to Caution of Assent in other Matters, for these *marvellous Memoirs* of Monks, Friars, Sea-Captains, Pyrates; and for the *Historys, Annals, Chronologys*, receiv'd by oral Tradition, or Hieroglyphicks.

*P. 188. Line 7. insert this new Paragraph,*

A LATE ingenious Author justly observes, “ That the various *Setts, Partys,*  
 “ *Cabals, Factions* of Mankind, in larger  
 “ Societys, are all influenc'd by a *publick*  
 “ *Spirit*: That some generous Notions of  
 “ *Publick Good*, some strong friendly Dis-  
 “ positions, raise them at first, and excite  
 “ Men of the same *Faction* or *Cabal* to  
 “ the most disinterested mutual Succour  
 “ and Aid: That all the Contentions of  
 “ the different Factions, and even the  
 “ fiercest Wars against each other, are  
 “ in-

“ influenc’d by a sociable *Publick-Spirit* “ in a limited System\*.” But certain it is, that Men are little oblig’d to those, who often artfully raise and foment this *Party-Spirit*; or cantonize them into several Sects, for the Defence of very trifling Causes. Associations for innocent *Commerce*, or *Manufactures*; Cabals for Defence of *Liberty* against a Tyrant; or even lower Clubs, for *Pleasantry*, or *Improvement* by Conversation; are very amiable and good. But when Mens Heads are fill’d with some trifling Opinions; when designing Men raise in their Minds some unaccountable Notions of *Sanctity* and *Religion*, in Tenets or Practices, which neither increase our Love to GOD, or our own *Species*; when the several Factions are taught to look upon each other as *odious*, *contemptible*, *profane*, because of their different Tenets, or Opinions; even when these Tenets, whether true or false, are perhaps perfectly useless to the *publick Good*: when the keenest Passions are rais’d about such Trifles, and Men begin to hate each other for what, of it self, has no Evil in it; and to love the Zealots of their own Sect, for what is no way valuable; nay, even for their Fury, Rage, and Malice against oppo-

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\* *Ld. Shaftesbury's Essay on Wit and Humour*, Part 3. Sect. 2. p. 110. Vol. I.



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site Sects ; (which is what all Partys commonly call *Zeal*) 'tis then no wonder if our *moral Sense* be very much impair'd, and our *natural Notions* of *Good* and *Evil* almost lost ; when our *Admiration* and *Love*, or *Contempt* and *Hatred*, are thus perverted from their natural Objects.

IF any Mortals are so happy as never to have heard of the *Party-Tenets* of most of our Sects ; or if they have heard of them, have either never espoused any Sect, or all equally ; they bid fairest for a truly *natural* and *good* Disposition, because their *Tempers* have never been sour'd about vain Trifles ; nor have they contracted any *Sullenness*, or *Rancour* against any part of their own *Kind*. If any *Opinions* deserve to be contended for, they are those which give us lovely Ideas of the DEITY, and of our *Fellow-Creatures* : If any *Opinions* deserve Opposition, they are such as raise Scruples in our Minds about the *Goodness* of PROVIDENCE, or represent our *Fellow-Creatures* as *base* and *selfish*, by instilling into us some ill-natur'd, cunning, shreud Insinuations, “ that our most generous Actions proceed wholly from selfish Views.” This *wise Philosophy* of some *Moderns*, after EPICURUS, must be fruitful of nothing but *Discontent*, *Suspicion*, and *Jealousy* ; a State infinitely worse than any little transitory Injurys to which we might be expos'd

pos'd by a good-natur'd *Credulity*. But thanks be to the kind *AUTHOR* of our *Nature*, that, in spite of such *Opinions*, our *Nature* it self leads us into *Friendships*, *Trust*, and *mutual Confidence*.

SECT. VI. *The last two Articles of this Section, from the bottom of P. 244. to P. 249. are remov'd to Sect. VII. between the second and third Articles, P. 253.*

SECT. VII. P. 257. l. 18. *insert after the Word [future]*

THIS is the sole Foundation of the Rights of *punishing* Criminals, and of *violent Prosecutions* of our Rights in a *State of Nature*. And these Rights, belonging originally to the Persons injur'd, or their *voluntary, or invited Assistants*, according to the Judgment of indifferent *Arbitrators* in a *State of Nature*, being, by Consent of the injur'd Party, transferr'd to the *Magistrate* in a *Civil State*, are the true Foundation of his Right of Punishment.

P. 262. l. ult. *after [consequently] insert,*

WHEN Men are so numerous, that the *natural Product* of the Earth is not sufficient for their Support, or Ease, or innocent Pleasure.

P.



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P. 264. *l. first, instead of these Words*  
*[Self-love from Industry, and leaves]*  
*read,*

To Industry from Self-love, or the nearer Ties; and leaves us no other Motive than general Benevolence.

P. 265. *insert this Paragraph before*  
*Art. vii.*

THE great Advantages which accrue to Mankind from unprejudic'd *Arbitrators*, impower'd to decide the Controversys which ordinarily arise, through the Partiality of *Self-love*, among Neighbours; as also from prudent *Directors*, who should not only instruct the Multitude in the best Methods of promoting the Publick Good, and of defending themselves against mutual or foreign Injurys, but also be arm'd with *Force* sufficient to make their Decrees or Orders effectual at Home, and the Society formidable Abroad: these Advantages, I say, sufficiently shew the *Right Men* have to constitute *Civil Government*; and to subject their *alienable Rights* to the Disposal of their Governours, under such *Limitations* as their Prudence suggests. And as far as the People have subjected their Rights, so far their Governours have an *external Right*, at least, to dispose of them, according to their Prudence, for attaining the Ends of their Institution; and no further.

P.

P. 270. before Art. viii. l. 2. from the bottom of the Page, insert this Paragraph, number 15.

15. OR, more generally, since there can be no *Right*, *Claim*, or *Obligation* to *Impossibilitys*; when two *Actions* to be done by any *Agent*, would both tend to the *Good* of *Mankind*, but they cannot be performed both at once, *that* which occasions most *Good* is to be done, if the *Omission* of the *other* occasions no prepolent *Evil*. If the *Omission* of either will occasion some *new natural Evil*, *that* is to be omitted, whose *Omission* will occasion the least *Evil*. Thus, if two *Persons* of unequal *Dignity* be in *Danger*, we are to relieve the more *valuable*, when we cannot relieve both. *Ingratitude*, as it evidences a worse *Temper* than *Neglect* of *Beneficence*; so it raises worse *Sentiments* in the *Benefactor*, and greater *Diffidence*, and *Suspicion* of his *Fellow-Creatures*, than an *Omission* of an *Act* of *Beneficence*: we ought therefore to be *grateful*, rather than *beneficent*, when we cannot (in any particular *Case*) evidence both *Dispositions*. If omitting of one *Action* will occasion *new positive Evil*, or continuance in a *State* of *Pain*, whereas the *Omission* of another would only prevent some *new positive Good*; since a *State* of *Pain* is a greater *Evil* than the *Absence* of *Good*, we ought



to follow *Compassion* rather than *Kindness*; and relieve the *Distress'd*, rather than increase the Pleasures of the *Easy*, when we cannot do both at once, and other Circumstances of the Objects are equal. In such Cases, we should not suppose *contrary Obligations*, or *Dutys*; the more important Office is our *present Duty*, and the Omission of the less important inconsistent Office at present, is no *moral Evil*.

P. 270, 271. *instead of the first Paragraph of Art. viii. insert what follows.*

X. FROM *Art. vii.* \* it follows, “ That  
 “ all human *Power*, or *Authority*, must  
 “ consist in a *Right transferr'd to any*  
 “ *Person or Council, to dispose of the ali-*  
 “ *enable Rights of others*; and that con-  
 “ sequently, there can be no Government  
 “ so absolute, as to have even an *external*  
 “ *Right to do or command every thing.*”  
 For wherever any Invasion is made upon *unalienable Rights*, there must arise either a *perfect*, or *external Right to Resistance*. The only Restraints of a moral Kind upon Subjects in such cases, are, when they foresee that, thro their want of Force, they shall probably by Resistance occasion greater Evils to the Publick, than those they attempt to remove; or when they find

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\* See Art. v. of the first Edition.

that *Governours*, in the main very useful to the Publick, have unawares, or in some unadvised Passion, done an Injury too small to over-balance the Advantages of their Administration, or the Evils which Resistance would in all likelihood occasion: especially when the Injury is of a private Nature, and not likely to be made a Precedent to the ruin of others. *Unalienable Rights* are essential Limitations in all Governments.

BUT by *absolute Government*, either in Prince, or Council, or in both jointly, we understand a Right to dispose of the natural Force, and Goods of a whole People, as far as they are naturally alienable, according to the Prudence of the Prince, Council, or of both jointly, for the publick Good of the State; without any Reservation as to the Quantity of Goods, manner of Levying, or the proportion of the Labours of the Subject, which they shall demand. But in all States this *tacit Trust* is presuppos'd, " that the  
" Power transferr'd, shall be employ'd ac-  
" cording to the best Judgment of the Ru-  
" lers, for the publick Good." So that whenever the Governours openly profess a Design of ruining the State, or act in such a manner as will necessarily do it; the *essential Trust*, supposed in all Forms of *Civil Government*, is violated, and the *Grant* thereby made void.



A PRINCE, or Council, or both jointly, may be variously limited; either when the Consent of the one may be necessary to the Validity of the Acts of the other; or when in the very Constitution of this supreme Power, certain Affairs are expressly exempted from the Jurisdiction of the Prince, or Council, or of both jointly: as when several independent States uniting, form a General Council, from whose Cognizance they expressly reserve certain Privileges, in the very Formation of this Council; or when in the very Constitution of any State, a certain Method of *Election* of the Person of the Prince, or of the Members of the supreme Council, is determin'd, and the *Intention* of their Assembling declar'd. In all such Cases, it is not in the Power of such Prince, Council, or both jointly, to alter the very *Form of Government*, or to take away that Right which the People have to be govern'd in such a manner, by a Prince, or Council thus elected, without the universal Consent of the very People who have subjected themselves to this Form of Government. So that there may be a very *regular State*, where there is no universal absolute Power, lodg'd either in one Person, or Council, or in any other Assembly, beside that of the whole People associated into that State. To say, that

that upon a Change attempted in the very *Form of Government*, by the supreme Power, the People have no Remedy according to the Constitution it self, will not prove that the supreme Power has such a *Right*; unless we confound all Ideas of *Right*, with those of *external Force*. The only Remedy indeed, in that Case, is an universal Insurrection against such *perfidious Trustees*.

DESPOTICK Power, is *that which Persons injur'd may acquire over those Criminals, whose Lives, consistently with the publick Safety, they may prolong, that by their Labours they may repair the Damages they have done; or over those who stand oblig'd to a greater Value, than all their Goods and Labours can possibly amount to.* This Power it self is limited to the Goods and Labours only of the Criminals or Debtors; and includes no Right to *Tortures, Prostitution, or any Rights* of the Governed, which are *naturally unalienable*; or to any thing which is not of some Moment toward the *Repair of Damage, Payment of Debt, or Security against future Offences.* The Characteristick of *despotick Power*, is this, “ that it is solely  
“ intended for the good of the Govern-  
“ nours, without any *tacit Trust* of con-  
“ sulting the good of the Governed.” *Despotick Government*, in this Sense, is intire-  
D 2 ly



*Alterations and Additions*

ly inconsistent with the Notion of Civil Government.

FROM the Idea of *Right*, as above explain'd, we must necessarily conclude, "that  
 " there can be no *Right*, or *Limitation of*  
 " *Right*, inconsistent with, or opposite to  
 " the greatest publick Good." And therefore in Cases of *extreme Necessity*, when the State cannot otherwise be preserv'd from Ruin, it must certainly be *Just* and *Good* in limited Governours, or in any other Persons who can do it, to use the Force of the State for its own preservation, beyond the Limits fix'd by the *Constitution*, in some *transitory Acts*, which are not to be made *Precedents*. And on the other hand, when an *equal Necessity* to avoid Ruin requires it, the Subjects may justly resume the Powers ordinarily lodg'd in their Governours, or may counteract them. This Privilege of *flagrant Necessity*, we all allow in defence of the most perfect *private Rights*: And if *publick Rights* are of more extensive Importance, so are also *publick Necessitys*. These Necessitys must be very grievous and flagrant, otherwise they can never over-balance the *Evils* of violating a tolerable Constitution, by *an arbitrary act of Power*, on the one hand; or by an *Insurrection*, or *Civil War*, on the other. No Person, or State can be  
 happy,

happy, where they do not think their *important Rights* are secur'd from the *Cruelty, Avarice, Ambition, or Caprice* of their Governours. Nor can any *Magistracy* be safe, or effectual for the ends of its Institution, where there are frequent *Terrors of Insurrections*. Whatever *temporary Acts* therefore may be allow'd in extraordinary Cases; whatever may be lawful in the *transitory Act* of a bold Legislator, who without previous Consent should rescue a slavish Nation, and place their Affairs so in the Hands of a *Person, or Council, elected, or limited* by themselves, that they should soon have Confidence in their own Safety, and in the Wisdom of the Administration; yet, as to the fixed State which should ordinarily obtain in all Communitys, since no *Assumer* of Government, can so demonstrate his superior Wisdom or Goodness to the satisfaction and security of the Governed, as is necessary to their Happiness; this must follow,

“ That except when Men, for their *own*  
 “ *Interest*, or out of *publick Love*, have by  
 “ *Consent* subjected their Actions, or their  
 “ Goods within certain Limits to the Dis-  
 “ posal of others; no Mortal can have  
 “ a *Right* from his *superior Wisdom*, or  
 “ *Goodness*, or any other *Quality*, to give  
 “ Laws to others without their *Consent*,

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“ *express*



*Alterations and Additions.*

“ *express* or *tacit* ; or to dispose of the  
“ *Fruits* of their Labours, or of any other  
“ *Right* whatsoever”. And therefore, su-  
perior *Wisdom*, or *Goodness*, gives no *Right*  
to Men to govern others.



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*F I N I S.*

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